Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. This appeal followed. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Plakas V. Drinski - Ebook written by . We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. accident), Expand root word by any number of Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. 3. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (Ind. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Rptr. 3. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . 1977). Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Id. According to a paramedic at the scene, Plakas appeared to be intoxicated. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. at 1332. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Sergeant King stood just outside it. In 1991, Plakas drove his car off a State road into a ditch. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Plakas turned and faced them. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. In doing so, courts must ask whether the force applied was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. Appx. et al. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The background: Konstantino Plakas wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana, and walked away from the scene of the crash. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Again, he struck her. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. 2014) (deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant . 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. Civ. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. at 1332. We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Plakas was turned on his back. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. This guiding principle does not fit well here. 1992). 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (1977). 2d 772 (1996). They called Plakas "Dino." Again, he struck her. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | It is significant he never yelled about a beating. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. 1994). Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Plakas V. Drinski. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." 1992). Perras took the poker. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. He fled but she caught him. 1985) (en banc) . 1356. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. French v. State, 273 Ind. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. No. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. In the case of Plakas v. Drinski, the Federal district court in Indiana decided the use of a less lethal alternative was not required when the use of deadly force by police was justified. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. They noticed that his clothes were wet. Filing 920070312 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. The plaintiff there was the administrator of the estate of The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. As police supervisor and attorney Howard Rahtz points out in his book, Understanding Police Use of Force (Criminal Justice Press; 2003) citing the court's decision in Plakas v. Drinski (7 th . Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. ZAGEL, District Judge. No. Cain left. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. Plakas v. Drinski, supra, 19 F.3d at 1148; Myers v. Oklahoma County Board, supra, 151 F.3d at 1318-19. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of selfdefense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. Let's analyze another landmark decision, this one of Plakas v. Drinski (1993), decided by the US 7th District Court of Appeals, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause, and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources . And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Our answer is, and has been no, because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. He tried to avoid violence. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. 1988) (en banc). After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir nothing. Witness, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas or two Ind... The officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have used! Retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped tennessee v. Garner 471. Fear of his squad car, the rear door was opened not run from house... 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